An investigation into how Manchester City’s “trivial” legal victory has created an existential crisis for the Premier League
Executive Summary
Manchester City’s victory in their Associated Party Transaction (APT) case has created an unprecedented regulatory crisis for the Premier League. The tribunal’s ruling that shareholder loans must be treated as APTs has exposed eight major clubs to potential retrospective sanctions that could fundamentally alter the competitive landscape of English football.
The Premier League finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. If they punish City harshly for their alleged PSR breaches, they must apply the same standards to Arsenal, Liverpool, Manchester United, and other clubs with shareholder loan violations—potentially triggering mass relegations and compensation claims worth billions. Conversely, if they go easy on these eight clubs, any punishment of City would appear discriminatory and could be reduced to zero through legal challenges.
This explains why City’s PSR verdict remains undecided despite hearings concluding months ago. The Premier League cannot announce City’s punishment without first resolving the APT implications, yet they cannot resolve those implications without potentially destroying their own regulatory framework.
Potential Points Deductions and Compensation Claims
| CLUB | Potential Points Deduction | Estimated Compensation Claims |
| Arsenal | 39.9 | £250-350 million |
| Brighton | 45.9 | £300-400 million |
| Chelsea | 37.3 | £250-350 million |
| Everton | 55.5 | £350-500 million |
| Leicester | 16.5 | £100-150 million |
| Bournemouth | 14.4 | £80-130 million |
| Liverpool | 8.8 | £60-100 million |
| Wolves | 8.3 | £60-100 million |
| Manchester United | 17.2 | £150-200 million |
These potential sanctions create an impossible situation for the Premier League’s handling of City’s case. If City faces a 15-point deduction for their alleged PSR breaches, how can Arsenal escape a 39.9-point punishment or Manchester United a 17.2-point sanction? Conversely, if these clubs receive reduced or spread-out punishments, City would be entitled to similar leniency, potentially reducing their sanctions to negligible levels.
The Premier League cannot survive this level of legal chaos. What began as City’s “trivial” challenge to APT rules has exposed the discriminatory nature of the entire regulatory framework, creating an existential crisis that threatens the very foundations of English football governance.
The football media establishment initially dismissed Manchester City’s challenge to the Premier League’s Associated Party Transaction (APT) rules as a sideshow—a desperate distraction from the club’s looming 115 charges hearing. Then City won. And suddenly, all hell broke loose.
The October 2024 tribunal verdict that found key aspects of the Premier League’s APT rules unlawful wasn’t just a legal victory for Manchester City—it was a seismic shift that has fundamentally altered the landscape of English football regulation. What the media had dismissed as a minor skirmish has revealed itself as the opening salvo in what may prove to be the Premier League’s most existential crisis.
The irony is interesting. Arsenal, Liverpool, and Manchester United—the triumvirate that lobbied hardest for enhanced financial regulations to constrain City’s spending—now find themselves potentially the biggest victims of their own campaign. Their years-long crusade to “level the playing field” has backfired spectacularly, leaving them exposed to the very regulatory framework they championed. It is, in the truest sense, poetic justice.
Background: The Tangled Web
The current situation defies logical explanation. Manchester City’s hearing regarding 115 alleged breaches of Premier League financial regulations concluded in December 2024, yet here we are in July 2025 with no verdict in sight. For a case that should have produced a straightforward guilty or not guilty determination, the silence has become deafening.
The most plausible explanation is that the commission is waiting for the APT situation to be fully resolved before delivering their PSR verdict. This isn’t procedural cowardice—it’s legal prudence. The APT ruling has fundamentally altered the regulatory landscape in ways that directly impact how PSR breaches should be calculated and punished.
The interconnection between these cases cannot be overstated. City’s APT victory established that shareholder loans must be treated as Associated Party Transactions, subject to fair market value assessments. This principle, if applied retrospectively, would trigger PSR breaches across multiple clubs and seasons. Any PSR verdict delivered without accounting for these implications risks being immediately appealed and potentially overturned.
Everyone was asking “How?”
How can Everton spend all this money and comply with PSR?
How can Tod Boehly spend all this money at Chelsea and comply with PSR?
How can Brighton compete and comply with PSR?
Now we know, they circumvented PSR via shareholder loans. But it wasn’t just them, Arsenal and Liverpool were “cheating” too.
The APT Victory That Changed Everything
Manchester City’s triumph in the APT case was both comprehensive and devastating to the Premier League’s regulatory framework. The three-person independent panel didn’t just rule in City’s favour on technical grounds—they fundamentally dismantled the philosophical foundations of the league’s approach to financial regulation.
The central issue was shareholder loans, the financial mechanism that has allowed club owners to inject funds without seeking equity returns. These arrangements, typically interest-free and long-term, had been explicitly excluded from APT rules since their introduction in 2021.
City’s legal challenge was elegant in its logic. If APT rules were designed to prevent clubs from benefiting from non-market-rate transactions with related parties, why should sponsorship deals be scrutinised while interest-free loans worth hundreds of millions were ignored? The inconsistency was glaring, and City’s lawyers seized upon it with characteristic precision.
It’s crucial to emphasise that the tribunal explicitly found the Premier League to have discriminated against Manchester City on multiple occasions throughout the proceedings. The 175-page verdict repeatedly used the term “discriminatory” to describe the Premier League’s regulatory approach, finding that City had been subjected to unfair treatment that violated fundamental principles of competition law. The tribunal didn’t just identify technical flaws in the APT rules—they condemned the Premier League’s entire regulatory philosophy as being built on discriminatory foundations that unfairly targeted certain clubs while protecting others.
The implications were immediately apparent. Fourteen of the twenty Premier League clubs had shareholder loans recorded in their 2022-23 accounts, totalling £1.5 billion. These clubs had been operating under a regulatory framework that the tribunal had just declared discriminatory and unlawful.
In November 2024, clubs voted 16-4 to amend the APT rules to include shareholder loans, though the new regulations only applied prospectively. City continued to fight for retrospective application, while affected clubs lobbied desperately to minimise the impact of the changes.
If the APT ruling is applied backward to 2021, multiple clubs would face PSR breaches spanning several seasons. The financial impact would be enormous: Everton’s £451 million in interest-free loans would require approximately £36.1 million in annual interest charges at market rates of 8%, Brighton’s £373 million would add £29.8 million annually, and Arsenal’s £324 million would contribute £25.9 million per year to their PSR calculations.
The Premier League’s refusal to apply the ruling retrospectively isn’t based on legal principle but on practical terror. They understand that doing so would trigger a cascade of PSR breaches that would overwhelm their disciplinary system and potentially destroy the credibility of their regulatory framework.
The True Absurdity of Preferential Shareholder Loans and City”s PSR case
We know when FSG took over at Liverpool, they lent Liverpool £240m at an interest rate of 0.5% a year. This loan was to settle a debt to Holicks and Gillete via Kop Holdings. So these loans predate PSR and have been present since its inception.
The raises the blindingly obvious question:
“If Manchester City wanted to invest extra money into the club, why disguise it and “cook the books” when they could have simply leant City the money as a non-repayable interest free shareholder loan?”
Since City had no need to circumvent the rules, and therefore probably didn’t ie they’re not guilty of the charges.
The Clubs in the Firing Line
The cruel irony of Manchester City’s APT victory becomes apparent when examining which clubs stand to suffer most from its implementation. The very institutions that lobbied hardest for enhanced financial regulations—Arsenal, Liverpool, and Manchester United—now find themselves potentially the biggest casualties of their own campaign.
The Big Offenders
Everton leads with £451 million in interest-free loans from owner Farhad Moshiri. If these loans were subject to market-rate interest charges of 8 percent, Everton would face an additional £36.1 million annual hit to their PSR calculations. Applied retrospectively since 2021, this could represent over £252.7 million in additional losses across seven seasons.
The Toffees have already endured eight points in deductions for PSR breaches totalling £36.1 million. If shareholder loans are applied retrospectively, Everton could face breaches spanning up to seven seasons, each potentially carrying its own punishment.
Arsenal occupies a particularly interesting position with £324 million in shareholder loans from Kroenke Sports & Entertainment that could add £25.9 million annually to PSR calculations. The Gunners’ financial restructuring in 2020 was hailed as shrewd business management, with recent accounts showing they’re paying just £4.3 million in total interest on all debts—less than half what they previously paid on external borrowing.
Arsenal’s executives have publicly claimed “zero PSR concerns” despite the APT ruling, a position that appears increasingly untenable. The poetic justice is undeniable—Arsenal’s board were among the most aggressive advocates for enhanced financial regulations, arguing passionately that clubs should not benefit from artificial advantages provided by wealthy owners.
Brighton & Hove Albion presents perhaps the most complex case with Tony Bloom’s £373 million in interest-free loans representing one of the most generous owner investments in Premier League history. Applied at market rates of 8%, these loans could add £29.8 million annually to Brighton’s PSR calculations, a potentially devastating impact for a club that has carefully managed its finances to compete at the highest level.
Chelsea rounds out the quartet of major offenders with £303 million in shareholder loans that could add £24.2 million annually to their PSR calculations. The Blues’ recent financial gymnastics—including the controversial sale of their women’s team to themselves for £200 million—demonstrate the lengths to which clubs will go to navigate PSR regulations.
The Medium Risk Category
Leicester City faces £132 million in shareholder loans that could add £10.6 million annually to PSR calculations.
Bournemouth managed to avoid a PSR breach through a £71.4 million shareholder loan write-off, but their remaining £115 million in loans could still add £9.2 million annually to future calculations.
Liverpool occupies an interesting position with £71 million in shareholder loans that could add £5.7 million annually to PSR calculations. The Reds have long prided themselves on their “sustainable” business model under Fenway Sports Group ownership, regularly criticising clubs that rely on owner investment. FSG’s sustainable model is looking less sustainable when their own interest-free loans are subjected to the same scrutiny they demanded for others.
Wolves complete the list with £65 million in shareholder loans that could add £5.2 million annually to PSR calculations.
The Manchester United Exception
No discussion of regulatory inconsistency would be complete without examining Manchester United’s remarkable escape from PSR sanctions. The Red Devils recorded losses of £312.9 million over the three-year monitoring period ending in 2024—almost three times the £105 million limit. Yet they avoided any punishment through a combination of “exceptional allowances” and creative accounting.
United’s most recent accounts show a £113.2 million net loss for 2023-24, following losses of £28.7 million and £115.5 million in previous seasons. These figures should have triggered automatic PSR charges, yet the club escaped sanctions by claiming deductions for infrastructure spending, academy investments, and other “exceptional” items that reduced their breach from £78 million to just £8 million.
The contrast with Everton’s treatment is stark. The Toffees were deducted eight points for breaches totalling £36.1 million, while United escaped punishment despite losses nearly ten times larger. If the same punishment ratio were applied to United’s actual breach, they would face a points deduction of approximately 17.2 points—enough to significantly impact their league position.
What makes this disparity even more troubling is the inconsistent treatment of mitigating factors between the two clubs. Everton had several legitimate reasons for mitigation dismissed during their PSR proceedings, including the collapse of their USM sponsorship following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, pandemic-related revenue losses, and costs associated with their new stadium development. The independent commission largely rejected these arguments, ruling that such factors did not excuse the club’s financial mismanagement.
Yet when Manchester United presented remarkably similar mitigating factors—including pandemic impacts, infrastructure investments, and commercial disruptions—these were accepted without question as “exceptional allowances” that reduced their breach from £78 million to just £8 million. The inconsistency is glaring: identical mitigating circumstances were rejected for Everton but embraced for United, suggesting that the application of PSR rules depends more on a club’s commercial importance than on consistent regulatory principles.
If the Premier League can find “exceptional allowances” to excuse United’s massive breaches, why were similar considerations not extended to Everton’s much smaller violations, especially when Everton offered the same mitigating factors?
Estimated Points Deductions: The Devastating Mathematics
Using the established precedents from Everton and Nottingham Forest cases, we can calculate potential points deductions for each of the eight clubs affected by shareholder loan violations. For these calculations, we’ll use a conservative approach based on the Everton precedent of approximately 0.22 points deducted per £1 million breach, assuming market-rate interest of 8% on interest-free shareholder loans, applied across the seven seasons since APT rules were introduced in 2019.
Arsenal
- Shareholder loans: £324 million
- Annual PSR impact at 8%: £25.9 million
- Seven-season cumulative impact: £181.4 million
- Potential points deduction per season: 5.7 points
- Cumulative points deduction: 39.9 point
Brighton & Hove Albion
- Shareholder loans: £373 million
- Annual PSR impact at 8%: £29.8 million
- Seven-season cumulative impact: £208.8 million
- Potential points deduction per season: 6.6 points
- Cumulative points deduction: 45.9 points
Chelsea
- Shareholder loans: £303 million
- Annual PSR impact at 8%: £24.2 million
- Seven-season cumulative impact: £169.6 million
- Potential points deduction per season: 5.3 points
- Cumulative points deduction: 37.3 points
Everton (additional to existing punishments)
- Shareholder loans: £451 million
- Annual PSR impact at 8%: £36.1 million
- Seven-season cumulative impact: £252.7 million
- Potential points deduction per season: 7.9 points
- Cumulative points deduction: 55.5 points
Leicester City
Shareholder loans: £132 million
Annual PSR impact at 8%: £10.6 million
Seven-season cumulative impact: £74.2 million
Potential points deduction per season: 2.4 points
Cumulative points deduction: 16.5 points
Bournemouth
- Shareholder loans: £115 million
- Annual PSR impact at 8%: £9.2 million
- Seven-season cumulative impact: £64.4 million
- Potential points deduction per season: 2.0 points
- Cumulative points deduction: 14.4 points
Liverpool
- Shareholder loans: £71 million
- Annual PSR impact at 8%: £5.7 million
- Seven-season cumulative impact: £39.9 million
- Potential points deduction per season: 1.3 points
- Cumulative points deduction: 8.8 points
Wolves
- Shareholder loans: £65 million
- Annual PSR impact at 8%: £5.2 million•Seven-season cumulative impact: £36.4 million
- Potential points deduction per season: 1.1 points
- Cumulative points deduction: 8.3 points
Manchester United (based on actual PSR breach)
- Reported PSR breach: £78 million reduced to £8 million
- Potential points deduction based on Everton precedent: 17.2 points
The Timing of Penalties: Another Conundrum
The question of when and how to apply potential points deductions creates yet more dilemmas for the Premier League.
- Will all 8 cases be concluded in time for the punishments to start in the same season(s)?
- Should penalties be applied all at once in a single season, or should they be spread across multiple seasons to reflect the ongoing nature of the violations?
If the Premier League opts for immediate, comprehensive punishment—applying all deductions in a single season—the competitive impact would be devastating. As our calculations show, clubs like Everton could face over 55 points in cumulative deductions, Arsenal nearly 40 points, and Manchester United over 17 points. Applied simultaneously, these deductions would likely relegate multiple established Premier League clubs, creating unprecedented competitive disruption.
The alternative approach—spreading punishments across multiple seasons—creates different but equally serious problems. Extending sanctions over time would prolong regulatory uncertainty, potentially creating years of distorted competition as clubs operate under the shadow of pending punishments.
Most significantly, this timing question creates another conundrum for Manchester City’s PSR case. If the Premier League establishes a precedent of spreading punishments across multiple seasons for other clubs’ violations, this would create a powerful argument that any sanctions against City should also be distributed over time rather than applied all at once.
Consider the implications: If Arsenal’s potential 39.9-point deduction is spread across seven seasons (approximately 5.7 points per season), how could the Premier League justify applying a larger punishment to City in a single season? The principle of proportionality would demand similar treatment, potentially reducing any immediate sanctions against City to a level that would have minimal competitive impact.
This creates yet another catch-22 for the Premier League. If they apply harsh, immediate punishment to City while spreading other clubs’ sanctions over time, they expose themselves to accusations of discriminatory enforcement. Yet if they apply consistent standards and spread all punishments over multiple seasons, they effectively neutralise the impact of any sanctions against City, undermining the entire purpose of their regulatory framework.
The Punishment Precedents
The Premier League’s treatment of Everton and Nottingham Forest in the 2023-24 season established crucial precedents for how PSR breaches are punished. These cases provide a roadmap for calculating potential sanctions if shareholder loans are applied retrospectively, and the mathematics are terrifying for the clubs involved.
Everton’s Double Jeopardy
Everton’s punishment saga began in November 2023 with an unprecedented 10-point deduction for a £19.5 million PSR breach covering the three-year period ending in 2022. The severity of the punishment shocked the football world—no Premier League club had ever faced such a harsh sporting sanction for financial rule violations.
The Toffees successfully appealed the decision, with the deduction reduced to six points in February 2024. However, their relief was short-lived. In April 2024, they received an additional two-point deduction for a separate £16.6 million breach covering the 2022-23 season. The total punishment—eight points for combined breaches of £36.1 million—established a rough benchmark of 0.22 points deducted per £1 million of breach.
Forest’s Penalty
Nottingham Forest’s case provided additional precedent with a four-point deduction for a £34.5 million breach in March 2024. The club’s losses of £95.5 million exceeded the £61 million limit applicable to newly promoted clubs by a significant margin, yet their punishment was proportionally lighter than Everton’s at approximately 0.12 points per £1 million of breach.
The difference in punishment ratios reflects the specific circumstances of each case. Forest’s breach was attributed largely to their promotion-related spending and the Premier League’s refusal to allow certain deductions for Championship costs. The commission viewed this as less egregious than Everton’s sustained overspending across multiple seasons..
The Compensation Catastrophe
The retrospective application of shareholder loan rules doesn’t just threaten the clubs directly involved—it opens the floodgates to compensation claims that could bankrupt the Premier League itself. If clubs gained sporting advantages through regulatory breaches that are now being retroactively identified, every team that suffered as a result has grounds for damages. The legal and financial implications are staggering.
The Sporting Advantage Principle
The fundamental principle underlying compensation claims is straightforward: clubs that breached PSR rules gained an unfair sporting advantage that damaged their competitors. This advantage manifested in multiple ways—better players, improved facilities, enhanced performance—all funded by financial arrangements that are now deemed unlawful.
Consider Arsenal’s position over the past seven seasons. If their £324 million in interest-free shareholder loans constituted an unfair advantage, then every club that finished below them in the league table, missed out on European qualification, or suffered relegation while Arsenal benefited from this advantage has potential grounds for compensation.
The Scale of Potential Claims
The mathematics of potential compensation claims are mind-boggling. Premier League revenues are distributed based on final league positions, with each place worth millions in prize money and broadcast revenue. European qualification carries additional value through participation fees, broadcast rights, and commercial opportunities. The cumulative value of sporting advantages gained through unlawful financial arrangements could reach billions of pounds.
European Competition Losses: Missing out on Champions League qualification costs clubs approximately £50-100 million in direct revenue, plus additional commercial and reputational benefits. If Arsenal’s shareholder loan advantage contributed to their European qualification at the expense of other clubs, the damages could be enormous.
Relegation Damages: The financial impact of relegation is catastrophic, with clubs losing approximately £100-200 million in immediate revenue plus long-term commercial damage. If any club can demonstrate that their relegation was caused in part by competing against teams with unlawful financial advantages, the compensation claims could be astronomical.
League Position Losses: Even minor changes in final league position carry significant financial consequences. The difference between finishing 10th and 15th in the Premier League can be worth £10-15 million in prize money and broadcast revenue. Multiply this across multiple seasons and multiple affected clubs, and the potential damages quickly escalate.
The Claimant Universe
The potential universe of claimants extends far beyond the Premier League itself. Championship clubs that missed promotion, League One and League Two teams that suffered relegation, and even non-league clubs that lost advancement opportunities could all argue they were damaged by the cascading effects of unlawful financial arrangements in the top flight.
Championship Clubs: Teams that narrowly missed promotion to the Premier League during periods when relegated clubs benefited from unlawful shareholder loan arrangements could claim damages worth hundreds of millions. Promotion to the Premier League is worth approximately £200 million in immediate revenue, making these among the most valuable potential claims.
Lower League Clubs: The ripple effects of unlawful financial arrangements extend throughout the football pyramid. Clubs that suffered relegation from the Championship, League One, or League Two while competing against teams with artificial advantages could seek compensation for lost revenue, reduced commercial opportunities, and long-term competitive damage.
European Competitors: The implications extend beyond English football. If English clubs gained unfair advantages in European competitions through unlawful domestic financial arrangements, foreign clubs that were eliminated or missed qualification could potentially seek damages through UEFA or civil courts.
The Premier League’s Impossible Position
The Premier League finds itself trapped in a regulatory maze of its own construction, facing a crisis that has no viable solutions. Every path forward leads to catastrophic consequences, whether through legal challenges, competitive chaos, or complete credibility collapse. The organisation that once prided itself on being the world’s most successful football league now confronts an existential threat created by its own regulatory hubris.
The Legal Minefield
Manchester City’s APT victory has transformed the Premier League’s regulatory landscape into a legal minefield where every step risks triggering explosive consequences. The tribunal’s finding that shareholder loan exclusions were unlawful and discriminatory has created a cascade of legal vulnerabilities that the Premier League cannot navigate without sustaining massive damage.
The immediate legal challenge comes from City’s demand for retrospective application of the APT ruling. If the exclusion of shareholder loans was unlawful from the beginning, then all decisions made under that framework are legally tainted. City’s position is logically unassailable: regulatory discrimination cannot be cured by prospective application alone—historical injustices must be remedied.
The Premier League’s resistance to retrospective application is understandable but legally vulnerable. Their argument that applying the ruling backward would create chaos is essentially an admission that their regulatory framework was so fundamentally flawed that correcting it would be catastrophic. This position invites further legal challenges and exposes the organisation to additional discrimination claims.
The Credibility Crisis
The prolonged delay in resolving City’s case has already inflicted severe damage on the Premier League’s credibility as a regulatory body. The organisation that once commanded respect for its decisive leadership and effective governance now appears indecisive, incompetent, and potentially corrupt.
The contrast with other regulatory bodies is stark. UEFA, despite its own flaws, manages to deliver verdicts in complex financial cases within reasonable timeframes. The Premier League’s inability to conclude a case that finished hearing evidence months ago raises serious questions about their administrative competence and decision-making processes.
The Timing Dilemma
The Premier League faces an impossible choice regarding when to announce Manchester City’s PSR verdict. Every option carries devastating consequences, creating a catch-22 situation that exposes the fundamental flaws in their regulatory approach. The timing decision has become a strategic nightmare with no viable solutions.
If the Premier League throws the book at City, the same book must be thrown at 8 clubs (Arsenal, Bournemouth, Brighton, Chelsea, Everton, Leicester, Liverpool, Manchester United and Wolves). If the EPL “go easy” on these 8 clubs, this will influence any punishment City get/may reduce it to zero.
This creates an impossible situation for the Premier League. They cannot deliver a harsh verdict against City without simultaneously triggering investigations and potential punishments for nearly half their member clubs. The regulatory chaos would be immediate and comprehensive, potentially destabilising the entire league structure.
Conclusion: A Complete Mess
The Premier League cannot survive this level of legal chaos. What began as Manchester City’s “trivial” challenge to Associated Party Transaction rules has evolved into an existential crisis that threatens the very foundations of English football’s regulatory framework. The organisation that once prided itself on being the world’s most successful league now faces a litigation tsunami that could destroy its credibility, bankrupt its operations, and render its governance structure completely ineffective.
The mathematics of destruction are inescapable. Eight clubs face potential retrospective sanctions for shareholder loan violations totalling over £1.5 billion. Using established precedents from Everton and Forest’s cases, these violations could trigger hundreds of points in deductions across multiple seasons. The regulatory chaos would be immediate and comprehensive, potentially relegating multiple clubs and fundamentally altering the competitive landscape.
The compensation claims flowing from such widespread sanctions could reach billions of pounds, with 20-30 clubs having legitimate grounds for damages based on sporting advantages gained through unlawful financial arrangements. The Premier League’s limited resources cannot withstand such massive liability, creating the prospect of organisational bankruptcy and operational collapse.
Yet the alternative—selective enforcement that ignores clear violations while punishing others—would expose the Premier League to accusations of corruption and discrimination that would be equally devastating to their credibility and legal standing. The organisation faces a choice between immediate chaos and gradual collapse, with no viable path to regulatory stability.
The Perfect Poetic Justice
The most interesting aspect of this regulatory meltdown is the perfect poetic justice it represents. Arsenal, Liverpool, and Manchester United—the triumvirate that lobbied hardest for enhanced financial regulations to constrain City’s spending—have become the primary victims of their own campaign. Their years-long crusade to “level the playing field” has backfired so spectacularly that they now face greater regulatory exposure than the club they sought to constrain.
Arsenal’s £324 million in interest-free shareholder loans, Liverpool’s £71 million in similar arrangements, and Manchester United’s remarkable escape from punishment despite £312.9 million in losses all represent the kind of regulatory inconsistency and competitive advantage that these clubs claimed to oppose when exhibited by Manchester City. They demanded regulatory purity and got it—applied to themselves.
Manchester City’s legal strategy has been masterful in exposing these contradictions. By challenging the fundamental assumptions underlying the Premier League’s regulatory approach, they have revealed a system built on discrimination, inconsistency, and political convenience rather than legal principle or competitive fairness.
The clubs that lobbied hardest for City’s punishment—Arsenal, Liverpool, and Manchester United—never anticipated that their demands for regulatory enhancement would create such comprehensive chaos. They assumed that enhanced regulations would constrain their rivals while leaving their own arrangements untouched. The discovery that they too are vulnerable to the system they created represents the perfect example of regulatory hubris.
They have become victims of their own success, destroyed by the very system they helped design to ensure their dominance. Their campaign for regulatory purity has backfired so spectacularly that they now face greater exposure than the club they sought to constrain. It is, in the truest sense, poetic justice.
The regulatory monster that Arsenal, Liverpool, and Manchester United helped create is now consuming them, and the Premier League itself may not survive the feast. In seeking to destroy Manchester City through enhanced financial regulations, they have instead destroyed the very system they sought to control. The hunters have become the hunted, and the irony is absolutely perfect.
References
This investigative analysis is based on extensive research of publicly available documents, tribunal verdicts, financial statements, and regulatory proceedings. Key sources include:
Manchester City APT Case
1 Manchester City vs the Premier League: The APT verdict explained – The Athletic, October 7, 2024
2 Manchester City: Verdict reached in Premier League APT legal case – BBC Sport, October 7, 2024
3 Manchester City’s tribunal verdict: the key questions answered – The Guardian, October 8, 2024
4 Manchester City claim partial win over Premier League on APT rules – Reuters, October 7, 2024
5 Club statement – Manchester City FC – Manchester City FC, October 7, 2024
6 Premier League statement – Premier League, October 7, 20247.
7 Premier League APT rules declared ‘void and unenforceable’ in Manchester City legal victory – The Athletic, February 14, 2025
PSR Breaches and Punishments
8.Premier League and Everton joint statement – Premier League, January 17, 2025
9 A Reflection on the 2023/24 PSR Cases – Secretariat, August 29, 2024
10 Everton’s points deduction reduced from 10 to six points – The Guardian, February 26, 202411.
11 Everton withdraw appeal against latest points deduction – ESPN, May 10, 2024
12 Forest’s four-point deduction upheld – Reuters, May 7, 202413.
13 Nottingham Forest’s points deduction explained – The Athletic, March 18, 2024
Shareholder Loans and Club Finances
14 Explained: The Premier League’s letter on APT rules and City’s challenge to shareholder loans – The Athletic, April 5, 2025
15 Premier League Financial Results Season 2023/24 – Matchday Finance, May 6, 2025
16.Everton, Brighton, Arsenal and the Premier League clubs with the biggest shareholder loans – The Athletic, October 14, 2024
17.Premier League statement on APT rule changes – Premier League, November 22, 2024
18.Arsenal and Liverpool to escape liability for huge interest on owners’ loans – Yahoo Finance, October 7, 2024
Manchester United Financial Situation
19.Man Utd report net loss of £113.2m for 2023-24 – BBC Sport, September 11, 2024
20.Manchester United’s Financial Mismanagement: A Closer Look at the £312.9m Losses – Yahoo Sports, March 18, 2025
21.Revealed: Man United were handed TWO ‘exceptional allowances’ by the Premier League – Daily Mail, August 8, 2024
22.Manchester United’s ‘exceptional’ £40m Covid loss explained – The Athletic, August 8, 2024
Financial Analysis
23.Premier League Finances 2015-24 – The Swiss Ramble, May 26, 2025
24.Are Any Premier League Clubs Restricted By PSR This Summer? – The Swiss Ramble, June 24, 2025
25.Manchester United Finances 2023/24 – The Swiss Ramble, September 15, 2024
26.Arsenal Finances 2023/24 – The Swiss Ramble, February 20, 2025
Legal Analysis
27.Manchester City’s challenge to the Premier League’s APT rules – Mishcon de Reya, March 26, 2025
28.Implications of the latest decision in Manchester City’s challenge to the Premier League’s APT rules – LawInSport, March 20, 2025
29.An APT Legal Challenge: Manchester City’s victory over the Premier League – Morgan Sports Law, March 20, 2025
30 Manchester City vs the Premier League: Who do lawyers think won the APT case? – The Athletic, October 15, 2024